The Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal filed by the legal representative of Minority Leader, Dr Cassiel Ato Forson, against an Accra High Court’s decision to dismiss an application for mistrial in the ambulance trial filed by the first accused or appleant.
On Thursday, June 6, 2024, Justice Afia Serwah Asare-Botwe, presiding over the ambulance trial, ruled that the application filed by former Deputy Finance Minister Dr. Cassiel Ato Forson was not tenable.
Dr. Ato Forson and co-accused Richard Jakpa had alleged professional and prosecutorial misconduct on the part of Attorney-General Godfred Dame.
Their application referenced a tape in which Dame and Jakpa were purportedly discussing matters before the courts.
However, the judge found no statutory basis to declare a mistrial or to investigate the Attorney-General’s conduct.
Dr Forson’s legal counsel sought to appeal the court’s decision and the grounds for this appeal as set out in the notice of appeal were as follows;
a. The Learned High Court judge erred in holding that the Particulars of offences of Counts 1 and 5 contain sufficient information on the specific acts engaged in by the 1st Accused/Appellant that manifest “without due cause and authorization” as contained in Counts 1 and 5 of the charge sheet;
b. The Learned High Court Judge failed or neglected to give adequate consideration to the case of the 1st Accused/ Appellant;
c. The Learned High Court judge erred in law by refusing or neglecting to apply the rationes decidendi of the decision of Supreme Court in The Republic v Ernest Thompson & 4 Ors (Criminal Appeal No. (J3/05/2020).
Counsel for the Appellant chose to argue all three grounds together. In doing so, Counsel for the Appellant contends that when the duty of a prosecution in stating the particulars of offence are considered vis-a-vis the requirements of Article 19 (2) (d) of the 1992 Constitution and Section 112 (4) of Act 30, the Respondent has failed to sufficiently particularize the alleged offence.
The Appellant contended that the use of the term “without due cause and authorization” in the charge sheet without stating exactly what conduct constitutes acting “without due cause and authorization” amounts to a breach of the Appellant’s rights under Article 19 (2) (d) of the 1992 Constitution.
In arguing their position, learned counsel for the Appellant made reference to the case of The Republic v. Ernest Thompson & 4 Ors (Criminal Appeal no. J3/05/2020).
The argument was made here that the standard for the formulation of criminal charges is set in that case. Counsel for the Appellant continues and says that for a charge to have been properly formulated, it must sufficiently indicate to the Accused the nature of the acts the commission of which led to the events which the law has prohibited with penal consequences.
The Appellant argued further that for criminal charges to be consistent with Article 19(2) of the 1992 Constitution, they must contain basic facts in precise language that speak to the mens rea and actus reus.
The Appellant contended that charges 1 & 5 of the charge sheet do not sufficiently do so and that the expression “without due cause and authorization” is vague forcing the Appellant to guess what that means and as such those charges should be struck out as defective.
On their part, the Respondent contended that the Appeal must be dismissed since in the view of the Respondent, the charges were properly drafted and adequate particulars had been provided on the charge sheet.
The Respondent, the Attorney-General’s Office, referenced the case of Ernest Thompson (supra) and argued that its obligations when putting together the charge sheet were to “sufficiently indicate to an accused person the nature of the acts the commission of which has led to the event which the law prohibited.”
The Respondent further contended that when drafting the particulars in the charge sheet, it had to do so with the elements of the offence in consideration.
The Respondent broke down the elements of the two charges brought against the Appellant, and concluded that it had sufficiently met its obligations in drafting the charge sheet.
Consequently, having examined the charges under scrutiny, the Court found that they contain sufficient particulars as required under Article 19 (2) (d) of the 1992 Constitution and Section 112 (4) of Act 30 and held that this Appeal is therefore without merit and is dismissed accordingly.
